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H.R. 4 · 119th Congress

Rescissions Act of 2025

Rep. Scalise, Steve [R-LA-1] (R-LA) · Introduced · 5 cosponsors

Public Law 119-28Economics and Public Finance
Progress
100%
1
Introduced
A bill is formally introduced by a lawmaker; it is assigned an ID and sent to committee.
2
Committee
A smaller group of lawmakers reviews, debates, and edits the bill before it can advance.
3
Reported
After committee work, the committee releases a report and the bill can go to the full chamber for a vote.
4
House Vote
The bill has passed the full House of Representatives.
5
Senate Vote
The bill has passed the full Senate.
6
Passed Congress
Both the House and Senate have passed the bill; it moves to the President for final approval.
7
Sent to President
The bill has been sent to the President, who may sign it, veto it, or let a ten-day clock decide.
8
Became Law
The bill is now law — by the President's signature, by the ten-day rule when the President declines to sign, or by a two-thirds veto override.

Latest action

Became Public Law No: 119-28.

· from Congress.gov, as of August 8, 2026

Committees

Appropriations CommitteeBudget Committee

What this stage means

The bill is now law — by the President's signature, by the ten-day rule when the President declines to sign, or by a two-thirds veto override.

Why this matters

There are three constitutional paths to enactment, and only one of them requires the President's approval.

What can happen next

Executive agencies write regulations to implement it; courts may review challenges to it.

Study this bill

AP Gov
Unit 2 · Interactions Among Branches of GovernmentUnit 4 · American Political Ideologies and Beliefs

The constitutional question

Who controls money after it is appropriated? The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 lets a President propose rescissions but requires Congress to approve them within 45 days — this act is that rarely-successful procedure actually working, cancelling roughly $9 billion in foreign aid and public broadcasting funds.

The strongest case for

Congress appropriates in giant, hurried packages; a rescission vote is the only realistic mechanism to go back and cut line items that couldn't survive scrutiny on their own. Foreign-aid accounts had accumulated programs no majority would affirmatively vote to create today, and public broadcasting — created when three networks controlled information — now competes in an infinite media market and can fundraise like every other outlet. The Impoundment Control Act was written precisely so a President could force these questions and Congress could answer them on the record. A transparent, statutory, majority vote to stop spending is fiscal accountability functioning exactly as designed.

The strongest case against

Rescission unwinds the deal-making that makes appropriations possible at all: if a President can cherry-pick enacted trade-offs for cancellation, the minority party's incentive to negotiate the next package collapses. The cuts here fell on commitments other countries and local stations had already built budgets around — PEPFAR-adjacent global health programs and rural public radio stations with no commercial substitute. The dollar amount is a rounding error against the deficit, so the real function is punishing disfavored institutions, not saving money. And normalizing executive-initiated clawbacks drifts toward the impoundment practice the 1974 Act was passed to stop after Nixon simply refused to spend appropriated funds.

Foundational documents in play

  • U.S. Constitution

    Article I, Section 9: no money leaves the Treasury except by appropriation — rescission is Congress un-appropriating its own prior decision.

  • Federalist No. 70

    An energetic executive proposing which spending to claw back tests Hamilton's case for presidential initiative against congressional control of the purse.

  • Federalist No. 51

    The Impoundment Control Act's 45-day clock is a concrete mechanism of 'ambition counteracting ambition' between branches.

Organizations supporting

Organizations opposing

This has happened before

The 2018 rescissions package (H.R. 3, 115th Congress): President Trump proposed ~$15 billion in clawbacks, the House passed it, and the Senate killed it 48–50 when two Republicans defected. Same tool, same party in control — opposite outcome. The difference between 2018 and 2025 is two Senate votes, which is the whole lesson.

Practice FRQ

Concept Application. "In 2025 Congress approved a presidential request to cancel about $9 billion in previously appropriated funds under the Impoundment Control Act." (A) Describe the constitutional power of the purse. (B) Explain how the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 limits presidential control over enacted appropriations. (C) Explain one way the rescission process affects future negotiations between Congress and the President over spending.

Sources: www.congress.gov · www.congress.gov

Action history

Every recorded action from Congress.gov — 44 total.

  1. Signed by President.

  2. Signed by President.

  3. Became Public Law No: 119-28.

  4. Became Public Law No: 119-28.

  5. House

    House agreed to Senate amendment pursuant to H. Res. 590.

  6. Presented to President.

  7. House

    Presented to President.

  8. Senate

    Motion by Senator Kim to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Voice Vote.

  9. Senate

    Motion by Senator Lujan to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Voice Vote.

  10. Senate

    Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment by Yea-Nay Vote. 51 - 48. Record Vote Number: 411.

  11. Senate

    Passed Senate with an amendment by Yea-Nay Vote. 51 - 48. Record Vote Number: 411.

  12. Senate

    Message on Senate action sent to the House.

  13. Senate

    Considered by Senate. (consideration: CR S4381-4414)

  14. Senate

    Motion by Senator Cortez Masto to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 48 - 51. Record Vote Number: 394.

  15. Senate

    Motion by Senator Gallego to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 48 - 51. Record Vote Number: 395.

  16. Senate

    Motion by Senator Hirono to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 48 - 51. Record Vote Number: 396.

  17. Senate

    Motion by Senator Warner to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 48 - 51. Record Vote Number: 398.

  18. Senate

    Motion by Senator Schumer to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 47 - 52. Record Vote Number: 399.

  19. Senate

    Motion by Senator Markey to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 47 - 50. Record Vote Number: 401.

  20. Senate

    Motion by Senator Kaine to recommit to Senate Committee on Appropriations with instructions rejected in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 48 - 51. Record Vote Number: 403.

  21. Senate

    Motion to discharge Senate Committees on Appropriations; the Budget made. Pursuant to the order of 1/30/1975 as amended by the order of 4/11/1986.

  22. Senate

    Senate Committee on Appropriations; the Budget discharged by Yea-Nay Vote. 51 - 50. Record Vote Number: 391 Pursuant to the order of 1/30/1975 as amended by the order of 4/11/1986.

  23. Senate

    Senate Committee on Appropriations; the Budget discharged by Yea-Nay Vote. 51 - 50. Record Vote Number: 391 Pursuant to the order of 1/30/1975 as amended by the order of 4/11/1986.

  24. Senate

    Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 114.

  25. Senate

    Motion to proceed to consideration of measure agreed to in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 51 - 50. Record Vote Number: 392.

  26. Senate

    Measure laid before Senate by motion. (consideration: CR S4364-4365, S4374-4379)

  27. Senate

    Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred jointly to the Committee on Appropriations; the Budget pursuant to the order of 1/30/1975 as amended by the order of 4/11/1986.

  28. House

    Considered under the provisions of rule H. Res. 499. (consideration: CR H2796-2805)

  29. House

    Rule provides for consideration of H.R. 4 with 1 hour of general debate. Motion to recommit allowed. Bill is closed to amendments.

  30. House

    DEBATE - The House proceeded with one hour of debate on H.R. 4.

  31. House

    The previous question was ordered pursuant to the rule.

  32. House

    Ms. Kelly (IL) moved to recommit to the Committee on Appropriations. (text: CR H2805)

  33. House

    The previous question on the motion to recommit was ordered pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule XIX.

  34. House

    POSTPONED PROCEEDINGS - At the conclusion of debate on H.R. 4, the Chair put the question on motion to recommit and by voice vote, announced that the noes had prevailed. Ms. Kelly (IL) demanded the yeas and nays and the Chair postponed further proceedings until a time to be announced.

  35. House

    Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2806-2808)

  36. House

    On motion to recommit Failed by the Yeas and Nays: 208 - 218 (Roll no. 167).

  37. House

    Passed/agreed to in House: On passage Passed by the Yeas and Nays: 214 - 212 (Roll no. 168). (text: CR H2796)

  38. House

    On passage Passed by the Yeas and Nays: 214 - 212 (Roll no. 168). (text: CR H2796)

  39. House

    Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

  40. House

    Rules Committee Resolution H. Res. 499 Reported to House. Rule provides for consideration of H.R. 4 with 1 hour of general debate. Motion to recommit allowed. Bill is closed to amendments.

  41. House

    Rule H. Res. 499 passed House.

  42. House

    Introduced in House

  43. House

    Introduced in House

  44. House

    Referred to the House Committee on Appropriations.